Negative Bread

Platform: Broncoctf2026 | Category: Pwn | Type: Challenge | Difficulty: Medium | OS: NA | Author: D3v0o0Nu11 | Date: 2026-07-11 | Status: Solved Techniques: cmovns_edge_case, int_min_abs_negation_bug, signed_unsigned_comparison_confusion, static_disassembly

Summary

Task: x86-64 ELF banking simulator; reach a $1,000,000 balance to buy the flag despite deposit caps. Solution: chain an INT_MIN abs()/cmovns bug in Dispute (INT_MIN passes a signed <=999999 upper-bound check and is added to balance, making it hugely negative) with a signed/unsigned comparison bug in Buy Flag (signed negative balance is reinterpreted by an unsigned jbe as a value > 999999), so win() prints the flag.

Recon

Port scan

nmap -p- -sV -sC <TARGET> --min-rate 1000 -Pn

Enumeration highlights

• Event: broncoctf2026 | ID: 20260711_broncoctf2026_negative_bread
• Tags: business_logic, scanf, reverse, pwn, signed_integer, int_min, signedness_bug, abs_bug, ret2win_style
• Indicators: inline abs() via neg + cmovns, signed input compared with unsigned jbe, INT_MIN edge case in negation, win() prints embedded flag, scanf %d/%hd only (no strings attached)
• Source: 20260711_broncoctf2026_negative_bread.md

Foothold

Vulnerability / Misconfiguration

1. Cmovns_edge_case
2. Int_min_abs_negation_bug
3. Signed_unsigned_comparison_confusion
4. Static_disassembly

<command>

Exploitation

• See original writeup content for detailed exploitation.

Privilege Escalation

Enumeration

sudo -l
find / -perm -4000 2>/dev/null
getcap -r / 2>/dev/null
cat /etc/crontab
ps aux

Exploitation

1. N/A for challenge-type writeup; see exploitation above.
2. Flag obtained via challenge solve.

<command>

Flags

Key Takeaways / Lessons

• cmovns_edge_case
• int_min_abs_negation_bug
• signed_unsigned_comparison_confusion
• static_disassembly
• Tags: business_logic, scanf, reverse, pwn, signed_integer, int_min, signedness_bug, abs_bug, ret2win_style

Original Writeup

<details><summary>Click to expand original content</summary>

Description

"Your account starts at $100. The flag costs $1,000,000. Deposits are capped. Withdrawals can't go below zero. No strings attached. We don't even need to guard the vault. This bank is impenetrable!"

A Linux ELF binary named bank was provided.

English summary: A menu-driven "banking" ELF starts you with a $100 balance. The flag costs $1,000,000, deposits are capped at 3 transactions of $10,000 (max legitimate balance ~$30,100), and withdrawals are guarded against going negative. All input is numeric (integer scanf — "no strings attached", so no format-string / NaN tricks). The goal is to reach a balance that satisfies the "Buy Flag" check and call win(). This is a pure business-logic / signed-integer challenge: two integer bugs are chained.

Recon

file bank:

ELF 64-bit LSB, x86-64, dynamically linked, GCC (Ubuntu 11.4.0) 11.4.0, NOT stripped
SHA256: d5ba54ab23cdbe05c9d0a782295e7515009e0078ff6fedf6a124ae9cb579b00a

checksec: Partial RELRO, No canary, No PIE (base 0x400000), SHSTK/IBT enabled. NX status is irrelevant here — no memory corruption is used.

nm / symbols (not stripped):

• main @ 0x401223
• win @ 0x4011d6 — prints [!] TRANSACTION APPROVED and the flag
• flush_stdin @ 0x4011ff

strings reveals the embedded flag bronco{REDACTED} living in .rodata, printed only from win(). So this is a ret2win-style goal, but reached purely through the program's own control flow (call win), not via a stack overwrite.

State layout (in main, signed 32-bit unless noted)

Menu:

• [1] Deposit — requires 1..10000 per txn, max 3 total
• [2] Withdraw — requires amount > 0 and signed balance >= amount
• [3] Dispute a Charge — one-time, "up to $999999"
• [4] Invest — fixed 0.5% return (rate in bps via %hd) — red herring
• [5] Buy Flag — needs balance >= $1,000,000
• [6] Exit

All numeric input goes through __isoc99_scanf with %d / %hd. No string input path exists — the "no strings attached" hint rules out format-string, NaN/Inf, and buffer tricks. The intended attack is arithmetic.

The Two Chained Bugs

Bug 1 — INT_MIN abs() / cmovns edge case in Dispute (menu 3)

Dispute reads a signed 32-bit amount, computes an inline abs() and then enforces an upper bound before crediting the balance. The key disassembly around 0x4015e2:

; eax = amount (signed, from scanf %d)
mov    edx, eax
neg    edx                 ; edx = -amount
cmovns eax, edx            ; if (-amount) has SF==0 (i.e. >= 0), eax = -amount
                           ; -> the intended "abs" of a negative amount
cmp    eax, 0xf423f        ; 0xf423f == 999999
jle    <ok>                ; SIGNED compare: pass if eax <= 999999

The programmer's intent: "take abs(amount), reject if it exceeds 999999."

The bug is the classic abs(INT_MIN) is still INT_MIN:

• Input amount = -2147483648 (INT_MIN, 0x80000000).
• neg edx on INT_MIN yields INT_MIN again (it has no positive counterpart) and sets SF = 1 (result is negative).
• cmovns eax, edx moves only when SF == 0. Since SF == 1, the move is skipped — eax keeps the original INT_MIN, not a positive magnitude.
• cmp eax, 0xf423f; jle is a signed comparison. INT_MIN (-2147483648) is <= 999999, so the upper-bound check passes.

The code then adds the original input to the balance:

balance = 100 + (-2147483648) = -2147483548

No 32-bit addition overflow occurs (result fits in int32), and dispute_used is set. Result: balance is now a huge negative number, -2147483548.

Bug 2 — signed/unsigned comparison confusion in Buy Flag (menu 5)

Buy Flag is supposed to require balance >= 1000000, but the check at 0x401713 loads the signed balance and compares it with an unsigned branch:

mov    eax, [rbp-4]        ; eax = balance (stored as signed int)
cmp    eax, 0xf423f        ; 999999
jbe    <reject>            ; UNSIGNED compare: reject if (unsigned)balance <= 999999
call   win                 ; else -> print the flag

jbe treats the 32-bit value as unsigned. Our balance -2147483548 has the bit pattern 0x80000064, which as an unsigned integer is 2147483748. That is far greater than 999999, so jbe is not taken and control falls through to call win, which prints the flag.

(A legitimate $1,000,000 balance would also pass this check — the bug is that a negative balance masquerades as a gigantic positive one.)

Why the two bugs are needed together

• Bug 1 alone gets you a negative balance but is meaningless on its own.
• Bug 2 alone can't be reached: you can't push the balance above $1M through legitimate deposits (capped at 3 × $10,000 = $30,100).
• Chained: Bug 1 makes the balance a "large unsigned" value that Bug 2's jbe happily accepts. Dispute's negative-magnitude credit + Buy Flag's unsigned compare = free flag.

Solution

No script or memory corruption is needed — just three lines fed to stdin:

3
-2147483648
5

1. 3 — choose Dispute a Charge.
2. -2147483648 — submit INT_MIN; passes the signed <=999999 check and sets balance = -2147483548.
3. 5 — choose Buy Flag; the unsigned jbe sees 2147483748 > 999999, falls through to call win, and the flag is printed.

Reproduce:

printf '3\n-2147483648\n5\n' | ./bank
# ... [!] TRANSACTION APPROVED
# bronco{REDACTED}

What did NOT work (for other solvers)

• Ordinary negative deposits/withdrawals are rejected: Deposit requires 1..10000; Withdraw requires amount > 0 and signed balance >= amount.
• Deposit is capped at 3 txns of $10,000 → max legitimate balance $30,100; you can never reach $1M honestly.
• NaN/Inf bypass is impossible: every input uses integer scanf formats (%d, %hd) — the "no strings attached" hint.
• Invest (menu 4) is a red herring — its 0.5% return is not needed.

</details>

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Auto-tracked: saved to WriteUps; run /xesor-revise to fold lessons into XESXor_Methodology.md.

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